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2004)). On the other hand, a "one-to-
one transfer of property, executed out-
side the confines of an integrated
development plan. . . would certainly
raise a suspicion that a private purpose
was afoot"; such cases could "be con-
fronted if and when they arise." Id. at
2667. "Courts have viewed such aber-
rations with a skeptical eye." Id. at 2667
n.17 (citing, inter alia, 99 Cents Only
Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,
237 E Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001)).
Private noncharitable redevelopers
always have private purposes afoot.
The issue is whether public officials are
guided by bribery or self-dealing. If so,
they violate existing laws. If not, what
does it mean to claim that their actions
are "pretextual"? In 99 Cents Only
Stores, for instance, officials condemned
a competitor's store at the behest of
Costco, a principal tenant in the
agency's most successful project and
the only shopping center in Lancaster
with a regional draw for customers.
Justice Stevens stated:
Given the comprehensive character
of the plan, the thorough delibera-
tion that preceded its adoption, and
the limited scope of our review, it is
appropriate for us, as it was in
Berman, to resolve the challenges of
the individual owners, not on a
piecemeal basis, but rather in light
of the entire plan.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
In light of this statement, was
Lancaster wrong in condemning the 99
Cents Only Stores parcel? That a city
might be interested in "comprehen-
sive" redevelopment of a wide area
might imbue the entire scheme with a
public purpose, but that fact does not
mean that the taking of an individual
small parcel necessarily is for a public
use.
Looking After Pfizer's Progeny
Justice Stevens stated that the New
London development plan "was not
intended to serve the interests of
Pfizer." Id. at 2662 n.6 (citation omit-
ted). But Justice O'Connor noted that
"any boon for Pfizer or the plan's
developer is difficult to disaggregate
from the promised public gains in taxes
and jobs." Id. at 2675-76 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
The record certainly indicates that
the needs of Pfizer were not far from
the minds of redevelopment officials.
Ultimately, however, the quest for the
definitive quid pro quo is not only illu-
sive but irrelevant. New London and
Connecticut want the reputation of a
redevelopment partner. If major com-
panies like Pfizer are pleased with the
upscale hotels, executive housing,
attractive shops, and other amenities
adjoining the sites they have redevel-
oped, other corporations that might be
significant redevelopment partners in
the government entity's future projects
will learn of it. Correspondingly, if
companies like Pfizer are unhappy,
future redevelopment efforts would
become more difficult.
Companies desirous of favorable
relocation deals and localities desirous
of jobs and tax revenues will find each
other. "Comprehensive" redevelop-
ment plans will be prepared and
agency records built. Procedural due
process will be copiously supplied.
New London was a distressed city,
but it is also a political subdivision of a
wealthy state. If the issue is whether
cities should seek relief from state legis-
lators on one hand, or from the profits
inuring from condemning the home
sites of people like Susette Kelo on the
other, the answer suggested by the
Supreme Court's decision requires nei-
ther elaborate forecasts nor comprehen-
sive study. N
J Kelo v. City of lNew London
Supreme Court Refuses to Hamstring
Local Governments
By James C. Smith
he Court's decision last term in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655
(2005), has drawn heavy fire, most of it unmerited. By the narrowest of
margins, the Court held that the city could take single-family homes to
develop an office park and to provide parking or retail services for visitors to an
existing state park and marina. Many observers thought the Court would take this
opportunity to display its "conservative" activism by reining in the power of emi-
nent domain. After all, the Court has grown increasingly protective of property
rights during the past two decades. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992) (right to build house notwithstanding beach protection legisla-
tion); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (right to operate
group home notwithstanding zoning). The Court, however, passed on the chance
to redefine the "public use" requirement to protect property owners from many
forms of government takings. Instead, the majority followed its long-standing rule
that the government takes for a "public use" under the Fifth Amendment whenev-
er its purpose is to provide a public benefit. And for a public benefit to exist, mem-
bers of the general public need not have a right to enter the property, and title to
the property need not remain in a public entity.
James C. Smith is the John Byrd Martin Chair of Law at the University of
Georgia School of Law and a contributing editor to Probate & Property's
"Keeping Current-Property" column.
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The outcome in Kelo stands solidly
on the shoulders of the Court's existing
precedents. To begin with, when a gov-
ernmental entity condemns land to
build a government facility, such as a
school or library, its power is unques-
tioned. Takings for public transporta-
tion-highways and airports, for exam-
ple-also raise no legal controversy
about the government's right to con-
demn. Citizens may complain that the
government's plan is not sound. They
may say that there is a better site for the
new school than the one selected by the
school board, or it may be wiser to
rebuild an existing school rather than
acquire a new site, that the highway
will destroy an urban neighborhood, or
that the value of the new airport is
speculative. All these objections are
political in nature. If substantial, the
objections may cause the government
to modify or abandon its plan. But if
the landowner goes to court to question
the legal need to take her or his land for
the public project, the government wins
hands down. The Court applies a defer-
ential rational basis standard of review,
just as it did in Kelo.
Not all exercises of eminent domain
result in government ownership of the
condemned property. As the Supreme
Court recognized early on, the govern-
ment sometimes employs eminent
domain to transfer property from one
private owner to another. This practice
became popular more than a century
ago to promote the private develop-
ment of transportation and utility infra-
structures. See Baltimore & Potomac R.R.
Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317
(1883). Today, condemnations for the
benefit of privately owned railroads are
rare because that form of transportation
has long been in decline. Condem-
nations to support power companies
and other utilities, however, still hap-
pen frequently. Although few owners
want an easement taken from their
property for power lines, no one ques-
tions the legality of the practice. The
power grid is important.
Decades ago the Court could have
drawn the line at privately owned
transportation and utility infrastructure
uses, prohibiting all other eminent
domain exercises that transfer owner-
ship to the private sector. The Court,
however, chose not to confine the con-
cept of "public use" in this way
Instead, it broadly interpreted that con-
cept to include any use that benefits the
public, whoever the transferee may be.
Of particular importance were two
modem rulings. In Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954), the Court upheld slum
clearance for urban renewal. Then in
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467
U.S. 229 (1984), the Court permitted
Hawaii to compel landlords to sell their
properties to their residential tenants, thus
breaking up large Hawaiian estates, the
size of which had prevented the develop-
ment of a normal market for the purchase
of owner-occupied housing. In Kelo, the
question was whether the public benefit
theory properly extended to government
efforts at economic development,
designed to revitalize the community
with new jobs and a higher tax base.
Relying on its earlier rulings, a five-Justice
majority concluded that it did.
In their dissenting opinions, Justices
O'Connor and Thomas argued that the
majority had stretched "public use"
beyond recognition, in effect reading that
limit out of the Constitution. The dis-
senters' opinions, however, are laced with
flaws, thus suggesting that the majority
reached the right result in refusing to
strike down "economic development"
takings. Justice O'Connor advanced a
twofold argument for overturning the city
of New London's development plan,
without overruling Berman or Midkiff. As
to Berman, she reasoned that economic
development is different from, and less
important than, rectifying urban blight.
125 S. Ct. at 2674-75. The assertion
(1) is not self-evident, (2) does not fit the
underlying facts of Kelo because the state
identified the entire community as a "dis-
tressed municipality," and (3) if general-
ized, would invite a nightmarish sprawl
of litigation over whether particular tak-
ings qualify as "important." Second,
Justice O'Connor claimed that Berman and
Midkiff are best understood as cases in
which the landowners were inflicting
"affirmative harm on society" by their
present use of the properties, id. at 2674,
while the New London homeowners
were blameless in this respect. This inter-
pretation of the cases is especially uncon-
vincing. There was nothing wrong with
Mr. Berman's department store; indeed,
the government conceded it was not
blighted and did not contribute at all to
the slum characteristics of the surround-
ing neighborhood. Whether the Hawaiian
landlords in Midkiff were "harming" their
tenants and society is debatable, to say the
least. If they were, the harm they were
causing by refusing to sell their properties
to tenants does not look much different
from the harm New London homeowners
were causing by refusing to sell to the
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builder of an office park. In each case,
the challengers of the government's
program were simply putting their own
self-interest above that of their neigh-
bors.
Justice Thomas's opinion was more
radical and more forthright than Justice
O'Connor's. Invoking what he per-
ceived to be the original intent of the
framers of the Constitution, Justice
Thomas argued that "public use" must
be narrower than "public purpose,"
and therefore Berman and Midkiff
should be overruled. Justice Thomas
would permit forced transfers to a pri-
vate owner only if "the public has a
legal right to use" the property after the
taking occurs. 125 S. Ct. at 2679. It is not
dear, however, why the "legal right to
use" rule did not apply on the facts of
Kelo. Members of the public, after all,
could rent space in the developed proj-
ect just as surely as members of the
public can use a railroad if (but only if)
they buy a ticket. New London's plan
for the parcel that supports the state
park seems especially unassailable
under Justice Thomas's test because
parking and retail services would pre-
sumably be open to one and all. Justice
Thomas's assertion that we should look
to the intent of the drafters of the Bill of
Rights would also support the city's
position because the Fifth Amendment
as written limits only the federal gov-
ernment. The Court did not invent the
"selective incorporation" doctrine until
late in the 19th century.
Kelo is a major victory for state and
local governments, but it does not
mean that "economic development tak-
ings" will now take place routinely in
all states. The Court interpreted the fed-
eral Constitution, and state courts may
choose to interpret the takings clauses
of their state constitutions more nar-
rowly. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme
Court did so just last year, ruling that a
county could not condemn land adja-
cent to an airport to develop a privately
owned industrial park. County of Wayne
v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004). In the future, other state courts
will face the issue of whether to follow
Kelo's public benefit theory or to grant
greater protection to property owners
under principles of state law. A number
of state legislatures also have entered
the fray Several of them acted to restrict
the use of eminent domain even before
Kelo, and since Kelo, lawmakers in
Alabama, Delaware, and Texas have
followed their lead. Other states are
likely to adopt similar measures soon,
spurred by the much-publicized ruling
in Kelo itself. See, e.g., Sonji Jacobs,
Legislators Give Property Seizure Laws
High Priority, Atlanta J.-Const., Aug. 25,
2005, at 1C ("Grandma's house is at risk
if she isn't in the best part of town and
a corporate entity wants to build a plant
there") (quoting Shannon Goessling of
the Southeastern Legal Foundation).
Such state-law development, rejecting
the broad public benefit theory, does
not prove that the Kelo majority got it
wrong. Rather, it proves that federal-
ism is working. The Court properly
decided not to have the federal judi-
ciary decide, for every community in
every state, how broad or narrow the
power of eminent domain ought to
be. These choices-like most land-
use law choices-should be made at
the state and local levels, taking into
account local norms and circum-
stances. 0
Kelo v. City of New London
Six Myths About Kelo
By Thomas W. Merrill
elo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), is unique in the mod-
em annals of law in terms of the negative response it has evoked. The
initial reaction by lawyers familiar with the case was one of lack of
surprise. Within days, however, Internet bloggers, television commentators,
and neighbors talking over backyard fences decided that Kelo was an outrage.
Even Justice Stevens sought to distance himself from his own majority opin-
ion, declaring in a speech to a bar association that he thought the outcome
was "unwise," and that he would not have supported it if he were a legisla-
tor. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y.
Times, Aug. 25, 2005, at Al.
This author is not one who believes that eminent domain should be used
routinely. Nor does the author doubt that the current system of eminent
domain is in need of significant reform. But flogging Kelo is not a particularly
illuminating way to start a constructive dialogue about what is right and
wrong with eminent domain. In particular, six myths have been propagated
about the decision-myths that are likely to cloud our collective judgment
about how to reduce abuses of eminent domain and provide greater security
for property rights, if they are not dispelled.
Myth 1: Kelo Breaks New Ground by Authorizing the Use of
Eminent Domain Solely for Economic Development
Echoing Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion, it is widely asserted that Kelo
is the first decision in which the Supreme Court permitted the use of eminent
domain solely for economic development. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2673
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (characterizing the question presented as one of
Thomas W. Merrill is Charles Keller Beekman Professor at Columbia Law
School. The author filed a brief amicus curiae in Kelo v. City of New London on
behalf of the American Planning Association.
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